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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
The nature of this case on appeal seeks a review as to whether the District Court 
erred in awarding Summary Judgment in favor of respondent/cross-appellant. 
ii. Course of Proceedings Before the Lower Court and its Disposition 
On March 18, 2011, the plaintiff/appellant American West Enterprises, Inc. 
(hereinafter '·American West") filed its Complaint in Minidoka County District Court. 
The Complaint improperly named Case New Holland, Inc., as defendant. American West 
alleged breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular 
purpose and additionally demanded reimbursement for the cost of pa1is and labor. 
On May 16, 2011, the defendant filed its Answer to Complaint and Demand.for 
Jury Trial in the name of CNH America, LLC, (hereinafter "CNH"). CNH's defense 
included the assertion that American West's claims were baned by a lack of privity 
between the parties. 
On May 4, 2012, CNH filed a Motion .for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Affidavit of William A. Fuhrman in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgrnent. (Tr. pg. II.) American West filed an 
Objection to .Afotionfor Summary Judgment, Affidavit of Frank Jensen, Affidavit of Hal 
Anderson, Affidavit o.f Chuck Simmons, and Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. (Tr. 
pg. II.) Oral argument on the motion for summary judgment and motion for leave to 
amend complaint was heard before the Honorable Jonathan Brody on June 11, 2012. 
On July 13, 2012, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision Granting 
D~fendant 's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaint~ff's Motion for Leave to 
Amend Complaint. (Tr. pg. 70.) The 1'1emorandum Decision granted CNH's motion for 
summary judgment and denied American West's motion to amend the complaint The 
District Court found that privity of contract is required to recover for economic loss for 
breach of an implied warranty and that there was no privity of contract between the two 
parties. The District Court fUI1her found that American West was not a third paiiy 
beneficiary to any contract between Pioneer Equipment and CNH and was therefore not 
entitled to enforce any contract between Pioneer and CNH. Lastly, the District Court 
found that Pioneer Equipment although an authorized dealer of CNH, was not an 
of CNH. American West appeals each of these findings. 
On July 18, 201 the District Court issued its Judgment dismissing American 
West's claims. (Tr. pg. 80.) 
iii. Concise Statement of Facts 
On June 26, 1997, American West purchased a Case IH 3394 tractor (hereinafter 
from Can1eron Sales, Inc., which was CNH's authorized dealer and repair 
center. Subsequent to the purchase, Cameron Sales, Inc. was bought out by Pioneer 
Equipment Co., which remained CNH's authorized dealer and repair center. 
In 2007, American West determined to sell the tractor but realized it needed a 
new engine. Americai1 West therefore hired Pioneer Equipment to install a new engine in 
the tractor. American West fUither requested that Pioneer Equipment order a new engine 
from CNH to install in the tractor. The new engine was obtained and installed in the 
tractor at a cost to American West of $11,955.04. 
After the engine was replaced, American West decided to keep the tractor and did 
so for two years. In that time, American West only used the tractor occasionally and put 
approximately ten engine hours on the new engine. In the spring of 2009, the tractor was 
sold to Frank Jensen. Mr. Jensen put approximately five engine hours on the tractor 
before the engine blew up. Mr. Jensen returned the broken tractor to American \Vest, 
which refunded him his purchase price and returned the tractor to Pioneer Equipment in 
order to diagnose the engine problem. The new engine in the tractor only had 
approximately fifteen hours on it at the time it blew up. 
Pioneer Equipment tore down the engine to diagnose the problem and discovered 
that the engine supplied by CNH had a faulty valve spring that broke and caused the 
valve to drop down and contact the piston. This caused metal to be sent to the other 
pistons and valves resulting in catastrophic damage to the engine. It was also discovered 
by Pioneer Equipment that some of the valve springs in the new engine were used and out 
of character with the new engine. Pioneer Equipment than contacted CNH field 
representative Jeff Jensen and requested that the engine be warranted due to the faulty 
engine valve spring, but was told that the engine would not be warranted. Further 
attempts to obtain warranty service on the engine were unsuccessful and this action was 
commenced March 21, 2011. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT 
GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FINDING THAT 
PRIVITY OF CONTR.\.CT IS REQUIRED TO RECOVER 
FOR ECONOMIC LOSS FOR BREACH OF AN IMPLIED 
\VARRANTY. 
A. Idaho Cases/Law 
CNH relied heavily upon the Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc., v. Cessna 
Air Co., and the subsequent line of cases in their argument that privity of contract is 
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required in an action to recover economic loss for breach of implied warranties. Salmon 
Rivers 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975). The District Court, relying upon Nelson v. 
Anderson Lumber Co., found in its Memorandum Decision that the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has reaffirmed, as recently as 2004, that privity of contract is required to recover 
economic loss for breach of implied warranties. Nelson 140 Idaho 702, 707 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 2004 ). The District Co mi further wrote that while it was "sympathetic to the 
possibility that the economic loss rule coupled with the privity requirement may result in 
little or no recovery for American West, it is not this court's prerogative to ignore 
precedent. Memorandum o.fDecision p.5. The District Court does not address the 
holdings of State v. lvlitchell Const. Co. or Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin. 
In ~Mitchell Const. Co., this Court did not directly address the issue of privity in 
relation the economic loss rule in its holding, rather Summary Judgment was affinned on 
other principles. State v. Mitchell Const. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984). 
However, in dictum three Justices voice their opinion that the previous holding in Salmon 
Rivers was no longer valid. 
Chief Justice Donaldson expressly did not concur with the majority opinion in 
regards to Salmon Rivers. Id. at 337, 1351. Rather, Chief Justice Donaldson wrote that 
he could not concur in the adoption or approval of the previous holding in Salmon Rivers. 
Id. at 338, 1352. In reaching his decision, he relied upon an Alaskan Supreme Comi 
case: 
It is not the merchant who has defectively manufactured the 
product. Nor is it usually the merchant who advertises the 
product on such a large scale as to attract customers. We 
have in our society literally scores of large, financially 
responsible manufacturers who place their wares in the 
stream of commerce not only with the realization, but with 
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the avowed purposes, that these goods will find their way 
into hands of the consumer. Only the consumer will 
use products; and only the consumer will be injured 
by them should they prove defective. 
Morrow v. 1\lew Moon Homes. Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976) citing Kassab v. 
Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, A.2d 848, 853 ( 1968). 
Justice Huntley, in his dissenting opinion, wrote that the "continued validity of 
Salrnon Rivers is questionable-the requirement ... of privity in implied warranty for 
economic loss did not make sense when the decision was written and its application has 
resulted in substantial injustice to many litigants Idaho since 1975. We should simply 
overrule that case at this time." 1\1itchell Const. at 
Upon rehearing the case after remand, Justice Donaldson and Justice 
Huntley continued to adhere to their previous opinions. Justice Bistline, however, 
changed positions and wrote: "I now fully agree with the view earlier expressed by Chief 
Justice Donaldson and Justice Huntley that Salmon Rivers should be overruled, and so 
vote." Id. at 341, 1355. Justice Bistline continued: "Unless I misread Judge Schroeder's 
opinion, he would not have granted the summary judgment if Salmon Rivers had not been 
in place. If, as it appears, there are three votes to overrule that case, the summary 
judgment should be reversed and the case remanded to the district coui1 for 
reconsideration." Id. 
The result of the Mitchell Const. case was there were three votes out of five to 
overturn the privity requirements set out in Salmon Rivers. The requirement of privity in 
cases that dealt solely with economic loss had been overturned; however was no 
clear statement from this Court aiticulating this result. 
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The clear and concise statement regarding the continued validity of the Salmon 
Rivers privity requirement came from Justice Bistline in his concuJTence in Tusch 
Enterprises v. Coffin. Justice Bistline wrote: "Having concuned in the majority opinion, 
I write only to infom1 the trial bench and bar that the Salmon Rivers v. Cessna Aircraft 
Co. case, which is recognized as having continued by doubtful validity in the opinion for 
the Court, was specifically oveJTuled in the State v. J\!fitchell case ... '' Tusch Ente1JJrises v. 
Coffin, 113 ldaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987). 
In the Tusch Ente1JJrises case, this court addressed but did not decide the issue of 
privity in relation to the economic loss rule. Rather, the Court decided the issue of privity 
in relation to subsequent purchasers of residential dwellings and the ability of subsequent 
purchasers to rely upon the implied wananty of habitability. Id. at 103 5, 50. 
Specifically, the court overturned any requirement of privity of contract between a 
builder and subsequent purchasers of residential dwellings who suffer purely economic 
losses from latent defects that manifest themselves within a reasonable amount of time. 
Id. The Court expressed that any other holding would lead to an "absurd result." Id. at 
1036, 51. 
The Tusch Ente1JJrises court relied upon its previous decision in Clark v. 
International Harvester Co., in reaching its decision. Id. at 1035, 50. In Clark, the court 
held that a party suffering only economic losses could not recover under a negligence 
theory. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978). The 
Tusch Ente1JJrises court explained this decision: "The rationale behind that decision was 
to allow the law of contracts to resolve disputes concerning economic losses. If, 
however, in the area of pure economic losses, negligence is to be preempted by contract 
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principles, as we ruled in Clark, then contract principles must be given a freer hand to 
deal with injuries the law has typically redressed." Tusch Ente1prises at 1035, 50. The 
Tu.sch Enterprises comi continued: "Therefore, we decline to extend the privity 
requirement enw1ciated in Salmon Rivers to the facts at hand. The instant case is not a 
goods case, and the question regarding the continued vitality of Salmon Rivers in 
such cases is better left to another day when a response on our part would be 
something more than mere dictum." Id. (emphasis added). 
In 1999, this Court again addressed the issue of privity of contract in cases of 
economic loss in Ramerth v. Hart. Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 983 P .2d 848 (1999). 
ln that case, the Court wrote that '·Salmon Rivers has been the subject of substantial 
debate regarding the desirability of the rule that it announced as well as its continuing 
validity." Id. at 198, 852. The Ramerth Court, however, read the Tusch Ente1prises 
decision that the question regarding the continued vitality of Salmon Rivers in [cases of 
economic loss] is better left to another day when a response would be something more 
than dictum as continued affirmation of the Salmon Rivers rule. Id. The Court wrote: 
"Despite Justice Bistline's opinion, however, the majority opinion in Tusch recognized 
the continuing validity of Salmon Rivers ... We conclude, therefore, that Salmon Rivers 
remains valid. We are not persuaded that the rule announced in Salmon Rivers should be 
fmiher relaxed to allow a claim for breach of implied wan-anty on the facts of this case." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The Salmon River string of cases has resulted in constm1ers being put in a difficult 
position. The Clark case found that a party suffering only economic loss could not 
recover under a negligence theory. This left contract theory as the sole means of redress 
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for plaintiffs suffering only economic loss. Tusch E11te1prises relaxed the privity 
requirement in a very narrow instance as it "would lead to an absurd result." Tusch 
Enterprises at 1036, 51. Dictum in both Tusch Enterprises and ~Mitchell Const. indicate 
that Salmon Rivers and its privity requirement have been oven-uled. The Ramerth Court 
concluded that Salmon Rivers remains valid and shouldn't be relaxed on the facts that 
were before the court. 
Therefore, it appears that American West has no redress through negligence 
theory given the holding of Clark. Furthermore, American West has no redress through 
contract theory because of the holdings of Salmon Rivers and Ramerth which exclude 
American West's claim due to a lack of contractual privity with the manufacturer of the 
engine, CNH. However, this appears to be the set of facts, as this is a "goods case" for 
which there is only economic loss, which the Tusch Enterprises Court had in mind in 
order for the Court to respond with a concise decision that would be "more than mere 
dictum." Tusch Ente1prises at 1035, 50. 
B. Other Jurisdictions 
Some jurisdictions have now abolished privity requirements in wananty actions 
where only economic losses were sought. In Nevada and Pennsylvania, the requirement 
has been done away with as there is "no reason to distinguish between recovery for 
personal and property injury, on the one hand, and economic loss on the other." Hiles 
Co. v. Johnston Pump Co., 93 Nev. 73, 560 P.2d 154, 157 (1977); accord Salvador v. 
Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 256 Pa.Super. 330, 389 A.2d 1148 (1978). 
In Missouri, the Court adopted the view that abolishing privity "simply recognizes 
that economic loss is potentially devastating to the buyer of an unmerchantable product 
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and that it is unjust to preclude any recovery from the manufacturer for such loss because 
of a lack of privity, when the slightest physical injury can give rise to strict liability under 
the same circumstances." Grappe! Co. Inc., v. US G.nJsum 616 S.W.2d 49 
(Mo.App.1981). 
In the privity requirement is not needed to assert a claim for breach of an 
implied warranty against a remote manufacturer of a finished product. Hininger v. Case 
C. !" F ""d 1 ("th C~1·r. 1994). mp., ..__1 ~ • .) J 
In New York it was determined that a buyer from a dealer could sue the 
manufacturer for direct economic loss for defective breaking system in a truck. Hubbard 
v. General 1'1otors C017J., 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Indiana summarized the purpose of 
privity as follows: 
Generally privity extends to the parties to the contract of 
sale. It relates to the bargained for expectations of the buyer 
and seller. Accordingly, when the cause of action arises out 
of economic loss related to the loss of the bargain or profits 
and consequential damages related thereto, the bargained 
for expectations of buyer and seller are relevant and privity 
between them is still required. 
Implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
pai1icular use, as they relate to economic loss from the 
bargain, cannot then ordinarily be sustained between the 
buyer and a remote manufactmer. 
Richards v. Goerg Boar and }vfotors, Inc., 179 Ind.App. 102, 384 N.E.2d 1084 
(Ind.App.1977). 
The Indiana Supreme Court expounded upon this privity requirement in Hyundai 
}.Jotor America, Inc. v. Goodin. In that case, the Court pointed out that the rationale of 
the privity requirement has "eroded to the point of invisibility as applied to many types of 
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consumer goods in today's economy." Hyundai A1otor America. Inc. v. Goodin, 822 
N.E.2d 947, (2005). The Hyundai Court explained that the UCC recognizes an implied 
warranty of merchantability if "goods'· are sold to "consumers'· by one who ordinarily 
deals in this product. Id. at 958. The Hyundai Court further explained that doing away 
with the privity requirement simply gives the consumer the contract they expected, while 
the manufacturer is encouraged to build quality into its products. Id. at 989. The Court 
continued: "To the extent there is a cost of adding unifonn or standard quality in all 
products, the risk of a lemon is passed to all buyers in the form of pricing and not 
randomly distributed among those unfortunate enough to have acquired one of the 
lemons. Moreover, elimination of privity requirement gives consumers ... the value of 
their expected bargain." Id. 
C. Absurd Result Under Existing Law 
The privity requirement combined with the economic loss rule is draconian and 
ill-equipped to deal with the realities of today's market place. A majority of products 
purchased by consumers are not purchased directly from the manufacturer and the 
consumer generally has no relationship with the manufacturer. Rather, products typically 
reach the consuming public through inten11ediaries. 
As it stands, if the conswning public suffers economic loss from a product they 
purchased. they must commence an action against the intennediary or distributor they 
purchased the product from who then must join the next intermediary or distributor until 
every intennediary or distributor that has been involved in the transaction, no matter how 
minimally, has been included in the chain of actions. Judicial efficiency and conf1ict 
resolution are clearly not advanced by the privity requirement. 
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In the case at hand, American West purchased, at great cost, a motor from an 
authorized dealer of CNH. CNH did not provide a warranty on the motor, therefore 
implied warranties attached to the engine. American West expected to have a new, good, 
and workmanlike motor. However, the motor self-destructed due to a faulty valve spring 
that appeared to not even be new. American West clearly did not receive the benefit of 
their bargain. CNH however, has no reason to fear making faulty, inferior or defective 
products because they rarely sell goods directly to the consuming public, and are 
therefore insulated from liability because of the privity requirement. Rather, CNH sells 
products through their authorized dealers. 
It was not Pioneer Equipment, the authorized dealer, who defectively 
manufactured the product. Nor was it Pioneer Equipment that was injured economically 
by its defect. However, under the privity requirement Pioneer Equipment should have 
been sued for the faulty motor. As the Court in the Tusch Ente1prises case found, this 
would result in an "absurd result." Tusch Ente1prises at 1036, 51. 
2. \VHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT 
FOUND THAT AMERICAN WEST WAS NOT A THIRD 
PARTY BENEFICIARY. 
CNH argues that as there is no written contract between any of the parties in this 
case, there is no ambiguity regarding the intent of the contract and the circumstances 
surrounding any agreement between the parties intent may not be considered. Reply 
Memorandum in Support of MSJ p. 3. The District Court however, believed that the facts 
were sufficient to provide enough evidence to construe the contract between Pioneer 
Equipment and CNH. A1emorandum Decision p. 6. The District Court found that there 
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was no evidence that the contract between Pioneer Equipment and CNH reflected intent 
to benefit American West. Id. 
ln reaching its Decision, the District Comi found that although American West 
argued that the engine was ordered specifically for the benefit and use of American West, 
the fact that Pioneer Equipment charged $3,000 for labor shows that Pioneer Equipment 
intended only to benefit itself. Id. 
The District Court did not address the Affidavit (?f Hal Anderson or the Affidm1it of 
Chuck Simmons in its Memorandum Decision. 
In making its Decision, the District Court relied upon Idaho Power Co. v. Hulet, 
which provides that the issue of whether a party is an intended beneficiary is one of 
contract construction. Idaho Po·wer Co. v. Hulet, 140 Idaho 110 (2004). In construing a 
contract, a court should look to the "apparent purpose the parties are trying to 
accomplish." Id. at 113. The District Comi wrote that as there is no written contract, 
there is no document to construe to determine whether the contract itself reflects intent to 
benefit American \Vest. Memorandum Decision p. 5-6. Therefore, under the District 
Courts decision, there can never be an intended third paity beneficiary in the absence of a 
written agreement. 
Chuck Simmons is the service manager for Pioneer Equipment and as such 
oversaw the ordering, installation, and diagnosis of the new -"'•~"''-· In his affidavit Mr. 
Simmons explains that "the engine and core were ordered specifically for the benefit of 
American West Enterprises, Inc .. and for use in their IH 3394." ,1/fidavit o.f Chuck 
Simmons ~ 5. Mr. Simmons continued: "That due to cost, it is not customary to order new 
engines and cores unless they are ordered for specific customers for use in specific 
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equipment." Id. at~ 6. Hal Anderson expresses in his affidavit "I requested Pioneer 
Equipment to order a new engine from CNH to install in American West's Case IH 
3394." Affidavit (~f Hal Anderson~ 8. Therefore, we have both Mr. Simmons (CNH's 
authorized dealer service manager) and Mr. Anderson expressing the "apparent purpose 
the paiiies are trying to accomplish," which was to benefit American West with a 
working engine in its tractor. Idaho Power Co. at 113. 
The District Comi relied upon the Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co. case in 
reaching that decision. In that case, the Court analogized the relationship between 
property owners, the general contractor, and the subcontractors. Nelson v. Anderson 
Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702 (2004). That case is no analogous to the case at hand. 
American West did not hire a general contractor to do general construction work for 
them. Rather, American West expressly requested the authorized dealer of a 
manufacturer to special order ai1 engine for American Wests' use and benefit. 
In Reed v. City o.f Chicago, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois found that since the benefit of paper gowns were for the protection of 
potentially suicidal detainees, privity was not required as the detainees were the intended 
beneficiaries of the paper gowns. Reed v. City of Chicago, 263 F.Supp.2d 1123 (N.D. 
Illinois 2003). In that case, the mother of an inmate sued the manufacturer of paper 
gowns that were used by the City of Chicago to clothe potentially suicidal inmates, after 
her son committed suicide with a paper gown that did not tear away. Id. The Comi 
wrote in its findings: 
The beneficiary of any wan-anty made by the manufacturer 
and designer of the gown is necessarily a potentially 
suicidal detainee like Reed. If protection is not provided to 
plaintiffs like Reed, any warranty as to the safety of the 
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Id. at 1126. 
gown would have little, if any, effect. In designing and 
manufacturing the gown, the defendants contemplated that 
the users of the gown would be detainees ... For these 
reasons, a detainee of the City like Reed must be able to 
enforce the protections of any warranties made by the 
manufacturer and designer of the gown. 
Similar to the Reed case, CNH does not manufacture engines for the benefit of 
their Authorized Dealers. If that were so, they would have gone out of business long ago 
as the Authorized Dealers have no need for engines other than to install them in intended 
third parties tractors. Rather, CNH manufactures engines for the benefit of tractor owners 
such as American West. 
It is clear from the Affidavit a_/ Chuck Simmons and the Alf/davit of Hal Anderson, 
that American West was the intended beneficiary of the transaction. 
3. \VHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT 
FOUND THAT PIONEER EQUIPMENT WAS NOT AN 
AGENT OF CNHAMERJCA. 
The District Comi found in its Memorandum Decision that the question of 
whether Pioneer Equipment was an agent of CNH was a question of fact as the facts 
relied upon to establish the existence of an agency relationship were undisputed. 
Afemorandum Decision p. 7. The District Court based this decision on the fact that there 
was no dispute in the record that Pioneer Equipment was CNH's agent. Id. at 8. 
In Adkinson C01p v. American Bldg Co., this Court found that proof of implied 
agency is generally found in the acts and conduct of the parties, rather than from an oral 
or written contract which establishes the agency relationship. Adkinson C01p. v. 
American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 690 P.2d 341 (1984). The Adkinson Court fmiher 
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found that the existence of an agency relationship is a question for the trier of fact to 
resolve from the evidence. Id. at 409, 344. 
In Adkinson, the plaintiffs brought suit against a manufacturer of metal buildings 
for economic damages from the late delivery of a defective building. ABC was the 
manufacturer of the building and RSI was its authorized dealer. The lawsuit was 
originally brought against both ABC and RSI but RSI was dismissed from the suit after 
filing bankruptcy. The District Court found that there was no principal-agency 
relationship between ABC and RSI. Id. This Court, however, found that the evidence 
was such that reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusion to be reached from the 
evidence. The case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial on the merits. Id. 
Among the evidence that was established in the Adkinson case was the fact that 
RSI was an authorized dealer for ABC, that RSI participated with ABC in advertising 
ABC buildings, that RSI was supplied with ABC brochures and order forms and 
instructions, that RSI employees were given some training at an ABC plant, that ABC 
representatives were frequently in contact with the RSI office, and that RSI ordered the 
building in question from ABC. Id. 
These facts are parallel to the facts of the case at band. Pioneer Equipment was 
an authorized dealer of CNH and that Pioneer Equipment ordered the engine from CNH. 
It is apparent that Pioneer Equipment receives training from CNH on installation and 
maintenance of its products, that CNH and Pioneer Equipment jointly advertise CNH 
products, and that CNH and Pioneer Equipment are in constant communication. It is 
clear from the record that CNH acting through Jeff Jensen, told Pioneer Equipment that 
the engine would not be warranted. Affidavit of Chuck Simmons~ 15-16. 
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It is clear that at a minimum, Pioneer Equipment is CNH's implied or apparent 
agent. The question of agency should have been allowed to proceed at trial where a full 
body of evidence could have been established, much like it was in Adkinson. 
JU. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
If American West is found to be the prevailing party on appeal, American West 
requests that attorney fees be awarded for costs and fees reasonably incurred in the 
appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Therefore, American West respectively requests that this Court remand the case 
back to the District Court finding that the granting of summary judgment was improper 
for the above-mentioned reasons and that the matter be permitted to proceed to trial as 
material issues of fact remain. 
DATED this day of December, 2012. 
ROBINSON, ANTHON & TRIBE 
~CY Brent T. Robinson 
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